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RECENT CASES
Statutes, 45 HAvARD L. REv. 233, 234-237 (1931). Such an interpretation changes
the appraisal and sale statute from a provision of protection for dissenting minority
stockholders, and allows the use of merger to freeze them out, thus providing 
an
instrument for their destruction.
GoRoN L. JAYNEs
Domestic Relations--Rights of Putative Father. P (a putative father) obtai ned posses-
sion of his infant illegitimate child in 1947. In 1950 the mother took the child from the
father and gave it to H and W, a married couple. H and W filed a petition for adop-
tion in the juvenile court. P filed an intervening petition asking that custody of the
child be awarded to him by virtue of his rights as a putative father. Trial court held
against P on the grounds that (1) the putative father has no rights in the bastard
child, and (2) even if he does, this father is not a fit person to have custody of the
child. On Appeal, Held: dismissed on procedural grounds. (See 27 WASH. L. Rxv.
228). As to the rights of the putative father, the Washington court for the first time
indicated that the putative father, if fit, would have a right to custody of the child supe-
rior to that of everyone but the mother. Wade v. State, 39 Wn. 2d 744, 238 P. 2d 915
(1951).
It would seem that any discussion of the rights of the putative father would be
merely academic since he would rarely desire to. assert such rights; however, such
rights have been claimed in the Washington Supreme Court on three different occa-
sions during the last eight years. In re Blake, 21 Wn. 2d 547, 151 P. 2d 825 (1944) ;
State ex rel Smith v. Superior Court, 23 Wn. 2d 357, 161 P. 2d 188 (1945) ;. Wade v.
State, supra. This note will explore the origin 6f these rights and, further, will discuss _
the unusual relationsfiip which exists between the putative father and the child after
th; father has obtained custody.
At common law the bastard child Was nullius fillius-a child of no one. See State v.
Tieman, 32 Wash. 294, 73 Pac. 375 (1903). 'The child had no parents, the putative
father being treated as a complete stranger. "He (the putative father) is at most 'a
putative father in reputation only, but not in law." Appeal of Gibson, 154 Mass. 378,
28 N.E. 296 (1891).
In spite of this early common law conceptiont, the courts of tle United States have
generally honored the father's right to custody of the child as against eeryone but
the mother. French v. Catholic Comnuhity League, 69' Ohio App. 442, 44 N.E. 2d 113
(1942) ; Commonwealth ex rel Human v. Hyman, 164 Pa. Siiper. Ct. 64, 63 A. 2d
447 ( 9j." Perhaps the best explanati6n for this departfire from te otheory"of thi
common law may be found in Moritz v. Garnhart, 7 Watts 302; 32 Am. Dec. 762
(Pennr. 1838) : "Though a bastard be not looked upon as a child for any civil purpose,
the ties of nature are respected in regard to its maintenance. The putative father,
though not legally related to it (the child) is so far considered its natural guardian'
as to be entitled to the custody of it .. ." The Ohio Court, in French v. Catholic Com-
munity League, supra, in giving custody to the putative father stated: "We perceive
little profit to be gained in a dissertation upon what would have been the rights of the
parties under the. common law...
With the principal case, Washington has definitely committed itself to honor the
putative father's right to custody in accordance with the majority of jurisdictions. The
putative father then will apparently be given custody when: (1) the mother is dead
and the father is a fit person, see State ex rel Smith v. Superior Court, supra; (2) the
mother is "unfit" or does not want the child, see People ex rel Meredith v. Meredith,
272 App. Div. 79, 69 N.Y.S. 2d 462 (1947), cited in the principal case; (3) someone
other than the mother is demanding the child. Wade v. State, supra.
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Recognition of the right of custody in a putative father poses problems of the legal
relationship, and the correlative rights and duties, between the father and his child.
As to whether our court will treat the father as a natural guardian, or as a statutory
guardian or as neither is a subject which it has yet to consider. For instance, will
the putative father have a right to the earnings and services of the bastard child? The
Washington court has held, "It is the law of this state, as elsewhere, that during the
minority of a child the parents are legally entitled to his earnings. . . ." American
Products Co. v. Villwock, 7 Wn. 2d 246 at 267, 109 P. 2d 570 at 579 (1941). Yet the
word "parent" generally does not contemplate the putative father. Ex parte Newsome,
212 Ala. 168, 102 So. 216 (1924) ; In re Hardenbergh's Will, 144 Misc. 248, 258 N.Y.S.
651 (1932). If the relationship be one closer to that of guardian and ward, the putative
father would not be entitled to his ward's earnings and services. Madden, Domestic
Relations § 158 (1931). Perhaps this problem could be solved by calling the putative
father in loco parentis to the child, and ". . . generally a person who has definitely
assumed to stand in loco parentis to a child is entitled to his services ... ." Madden,
supra, § 120.
If the putative father takes the child out of the State of Washington to live, will the
domicile of the child change with that of the putative father, or will the domicile
remain in Washington until the court authorizes such change? If the father of the
bastard be the natural guardian of the child (as is the mother of a bastard) the domi-
cile of the child will change automatically with that of the father. Madden, supra,
§§ 145, 164. However, if the relationship be closer to that of guardian and ward, the
domicile of the child would not change without the authorization of the court. Matheu
v. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Company, 158 Wash. 396, 290 Pac. 1003 (1930).
Should the child desire to marry under the legal age, from whom must consent be
obtained? Where the child is under age, the license may issue ". . . if the consent in
writing of the father, mother, or legal guardian is obtained. .. ." RCW 26.04.210.
[RRS § 8451]. Clearly the putative father is not the legal guardian unless the court
has appointed him as such. In re Teeters, 173 Wash. 138, 21 P. 2d 1032 (1933). And
generally the word "father" in a statute does not contemplate putative father. In re
Derheimers Estate, 197 Wis. 145, 221 N.W. 737 (1928) ; Howard v. United States,
2 F. 2d 170 (E.D. Ky. 1924). If the child were once under the custody of the juvenile
court, the juvenile court might be regarded as the "legal guardian" to give the consent
necessary for the child's marriage. See State v. Speer, 36 Wn. 2d 15, 216 P. 203 (1950).
It is submitted that the recognition in the principal case of the father's right of
custody will make it necessary for our court to determine in the near future the exact
relationship between the putative father and his child.
ROBERT H. PETRsoN
Evidence-Impeachment of Witnesses-Showing of General Reputation for Unchastity.
D, charged with carnal knowledge of a 17-year-old girl, attempted to impeach the
credibility of the prosecutrix by offering testimony of two witnesses to the effect that
her general reputation in the community for morality was bad. The trial court excluded
this evidence, and D was convicted. On appeal, Held: Affirmed. Evidence of general
reputation for immorality is totally inadmissible for the purpose of impeaching the
credibility of a witness. State v. Wolf, 40 Wn. 2d 648, 245 P. 2d 1009 (1952).
Historically, the Washington Supreme Court has followed two different rules as
to the admissibility of evidence of general reputation for unchastity as affecting the
credibility of a witness: (1) admissibility as a matter of right; and (2) discretionary
admissibility. Admissibilty as a matter of rght was predicated on the policy announced
in State v. Coella, 3 Wash. 99, 28 Pac. 28 (1891), where the court, in holding that the
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